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ABSTRACT
Through a study of agricultural service cooperatives in Russia’s 
Belgorod region, this article addresses two gaps in the literature: 
first, the dearth of empirical studies on cooperatives in post-socialist 
Russia; second, the lack of attention to top-down cooperatives in the 
global literature, and the overly negative approach to the topic in the 
few extant studies. Whereas state attempts to establish agricultural 
cooperatives in Russia in a top-down fashion have largely failed, 
such cooperatives have sprung up widely in Belgorod. The article 
investigates: (1) what influence the (regional) state exerts on the 
cooperatives, and how that affects their daily functioning and viability; 
and (2) to what extent such top-down cooperatives might evolve into 
less state-led forms, such as classic member-driven or business-like 
cooperatives.
Introduction: the issue of top-down cooperatives
The global literature on agricultural producers’ organisations – also referred to as agricultural 
cooperatives – has a rich tradition of studies in the Global South, as well as in the West.1 To 
date, the countries of post-socialist Eurasia, including the former Soviet Union, China and 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE), have attracted much less attention. In particular, the post-Soviet 
region – with Russia as its biggest country – has largely been ignored.
This is especially remarkable when one considers Russia’s rich early history of cooperatives, 
and the extended literature on Russian cooperatives and family farms, which is generally 
associated with the work of Chayanov ([1927] 1991) and gained importance in agrarian 
studies in the 1970s through authors such as Shanin (1971). Agricultural cooperatives flour-
ished in Russia in the pre-Soviet period of the early twentieth century (Bilimovich, [1955] 
2005; Kotsonis, 1999; Pallot, 1998). By 1914, the agricultural cooperative movement had 
become the largest in Europe, with over nine million members (Kotsonis, 1999). However, 
with the onset of communism and forced collectivisation, voluntary cooperatives were 
replaced by obligatory membership of collective and state farms.
Very few comprehensive studies have been carried out on the fate of cooperatives after 
the demise of the communist system in 1991, and the subsequent decollectivisation. A 
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reason that the topic has been neglected is the assumption made by observers of post-Soviet 
agriculture that rural cooperatives have played a small role in development in rural Russia 
and, so the argument goes, are unlikely to become sites of dynamic growth in the future.2 
Instead, attention focused on private family farms (in the early 1990s) and, when the emer-
gence of those farms stagnated, on large farm enterprises (from the mid-1990s onwards). 
The view that cooperatives had a small role to play was reinforced by the fact that the Russian 
cooperatives that emerged are generally economically very weak and fragile, and that no 
cooperative movement emerged in Russia (Fedorov, 2013; Golovina & Nilsson, 2009, 2011). 
As classical cooperatives are perceived as an exclusively bottom-up activity of self- 
organisation, they could be considered as an outcome of various social movements (Gutiérrez, 
Atela, & Duenas, 2005), having similar prerequisites like social capital. Mamonova and Visser 
(2014) though suggest that rural organisations and movements in post-Soviet Russia are 
slow to emerge, if they do so at all.3 This is the case for a number of reasons, including the 
low level of social capital (in the sense of self-organisation capacity at the meso-level of rural 
communities) in Russia,4 (Murray, 2006; O’Brien et al., 2000, 2005; Visser, 2008, 2010), the 
ambivalent impact of marketisation and the ideological disillusionment of the population 
(Humphrey, 1999) which ultimately discredited the cooperative notion (Golovina, 2012).5 In 
the specific case of agricultural cooperatives, the out-migration of young and ambitious 
social strata and the subsequent ageing of the rural population are further obstacles to the 
development of a vibrant cooperative movement (Golovina, 2012; Visser, 2010).
Here we deal with service (consumer) cooperatives only, leaving aside production coop-
eratives which are also present in post-socialist countries. The cooperatives studied here 
provide primarily marketing services to their members, so they could also be called market-
ing cooperatives. Russian legislation distinguishes between two major types of agricultural 
cooperatives: consumer cooperatives and production cooperatives (in the law ‘On agricul-
tural cooperation’). The former are defined as non-profit organisations and the latter as 
commercial. In legal terms, consumer cooperatives include marketing, supply, processing 
and credit cooperatives, whereas the main goal of agricultural production cooperatives is 
collective production (see details in the section ‘Agricultural cooperatives in Russia: termi-
nology and trends’).
In this article we show that cooperatives in Belgorod are mostly established in a top-down 
fashion, a finding that resonates with that of Golovina and Nilsson (2009, 2011) in the Kurgan 
region. The global literature largely ignores top-down cooperatives,6 which are generally 
seen in a negative light, comparing unfavourably with the classic Western-European coop-
eratives. From the very origins of cooperative theory (particularly the basic cooperative 
principle of ‘autonomy and independence’) this view is predominant among Western scholars 
(e.g. Bijman et al., 2012 ) and international development organisations such as the World 
Bank and ILO (2001). Top-down organisation of cooperatives is widely assumed to discourage 
genuine member involvement (Barton, 1989; Dunn, 1988). Studies on transition countries 
by Western scholars and international agencies generally perceive top-down cooperatives 
as ineffective or even as a comeback of socialism (Bijman et al., 2012; ILO, 2001). However, 
in developing countries and emerging economies, they are sometimes acknowledged as a 
legitimate way of organising cooperatives (Mendoza & Castillo, 2006). Recent studies on 
China suggest that agricultural cooperatives with active state involvement and little volun-
tary farmer participation are quite widespread (Liang & Hendrikse, 2013; Lin & Huang, 2007) 
and can function effectively (Deng, Huang, Xu, & Rozelle, 2010, p. 497 ). In addition, a study 
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by Rankin and Russell (2005) on post-socialist Vietnam indicates that farmer initiative was 
weak and state organisational involvement was the key factor in the development of agri-
cultural cooperatives.
Little is known about the functioning and viability of such cooperatives, or about the 
prospects for their development into more member-based cooperatives over time.7 This 
article places these overlooked cooperatives in the spotlight, and aims to provide a more 
balanced, empirically grounded assessment of their functioning and prospects. Thus, we do 
not present another case of the difficulties of establishing grassroots cooperatives in post- 
socialist countries. Instead, we take this problem as a given, and study top-down established 
and governed cooperatives as a potential solution in settings where the prospects for gen-
uine, bottom-up cooperatives are currently limited.
Our study contributes to the recent literature on agricultural cooperatives in post-socialist 
countries. In so doing, it goes beyond an overly negative view of top-down cooperatives, 
and tries to assess their various benefits, limitations and downsides in the specific context 
of post-socialist, emerging and insecure economies with weak institutions. We focus on de 
novo (newly established) top-down cooperatives, as opposed to the successors of the Soviet 
collective farms. Such top-down organised cooperatives can be found in post-socialist 
settings, in several former Soviet republics such as Armenia, Belarus and Georgia (White & 
Gorton, 2006), and in reform-socialist China (Deng et al., 2010; Sultan, Larsén, & Huang, 2011). 
We build on work by Golovina and Nilsson (2009, 2011), who examined top-down established 
cooperatives in Russia (Kurgan region) based on surveys, while we provide a multi-case study 
approach based on qualitative research.
We address two main issues. First, we determine the state’s influence on these top-down 
established cooperatives, and its effect on their viability/functioning. We do so by focusing 
our analysis on the state’s influence on the daily operations of the cooperatives within the 
food chain. We find that – in a context of weak institutions and a hostile environment for 
small-scale farms – the top-down nature of established cooperatives has clear advantages 
at the start of their development; however, it also has some weaknesses, especially in the 
medium/long run. Second, we explore the extent to which such top-down established coop-
eratives might, over time, evolve into more ‘common’, less state-controlled and patronised 
(and subsequently more independent from the state in their daily operations) types of coop-
eratives (e.g. the classic cooperatives, or business-like cooperatives).
Our study investigates the implications of the cooperatives’ top-down organisation, as 
reflected in their daily practices and functioning. Although we do discuss the policy envi-
ronment extensively, we go beyond policy aims and formal implementation (e.g. in terms 
of number of cooperatives created and members involved) and look explicitly at the informal, 
everyday interaction between state officials and cooperatives. The latter, as we will show, is 
crucial in understanding the functioning, prospects, as well as the tensions and limitations 
of this type of cooperative. Our attention to everyday functioning informed our decision to 
use qualitative research methods. Our study thus differs from, and complements, the sparse 
research on cooperatives in Russia and the post-Soviet region, which is typically characterised 
by quantitative methods (see e.g. Golovina & Nilsson, 2009, 2011; Yanbykh, Starchenko, 
Mindrin, Tkach, & Krylov, 2012 ).
This article is exploratory in nature, as the research is still ongoing, and as this study is 
the first attempt at research of a more qualitative nature in the selected context. By giving 
insight into the functioning of top-down cooperatives through a few selected case studies, 
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this article will thus present some tentative conclusions on the further development of such 
cooperatives, and suggest directions for further research.
The article is structured as follows. First, we describe our methods and fieldwork region. 
Second, we provide a brief background of the Russian agricultural system, its structure, and 
cooperative development nationwide and in the Belgorod region. In the third section, we 
argue that Belgorod’s policy to promote rural cooperation brought about some positive 
results, especially in comparison to Russia at large and the Kurgan region specifically, where 
the process of cooperative emergence has been studied by Golovina and Nilsson (2009, 
2011) on the basis of primary data collection. In the fourth section, we analyse the reasons 
for the comparatively positive results in Belgorod. In the fifth section we consider whether 
such top-down cooperatives might, over time, convert into member-controlled cooperatives. 
In the conclusion, we synthesise our findings on the extent (and effect) of state influence 
on the cooperatives, their functioning in practice and their prospects. When addressing the 
conversion prospects of top-down established cooperatives, we will make use of historical 
(and international) analogies.
Methodology and regional background
Belgorod is interesting as a research region for two reasons. First, it features highly successful 
growth rates in the agricultural sector. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, it stands out in terms 
of its cooperative development.
Belgorod is located in the fertile Central Black Earth region, bordering Ukraine. As one of 
the smallest regions in Russia, Belgorod holds fourth place in the country’s agricultural output 
in 2012 (Rosstat, 2013b), with a strong focus on livestock production, especially poultry and 
pork. In 2012, it even ranked first in Russia in terms of pig headcount, with every fifth pig in 
Russia located in the Belgorod region (Rosstat, 2013b). It is also the number one region for 
meat production in terms of cattle, pigs and poultry (measured in slaughter weight).8 This 
success is based primarily on the development of large-scale farm enterprises in the form 
of agroholdings – integrated companies consisting of multiple farm enterprises and often 
other firms in the food chains; in fact, the Belgorod region is perceived as being entirely 
dominated by agroholdings (Epshtein, Hahlbrock, & Wandel, 2013). However, at the same 
time, Belgorod has actively supported the small-scale farming sector, in particular through 
the development of cooperatives.
This article is based on qualitative fieldwork conducted by the authors in the Belgorod 
region in the autumn of 2010, the summer of 2011 and the autumn of 2013, which consisted 
of focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews and observations. Being part of a 
broader research project on agrarian policy in Belgorod, the research for this article began 
with a comparative case study of two cooperatives: a large dairy cooperative, and a vegetable 
cooperative. Specifically, two focus group discussions were conducted in the dairy cooper-
ative’s milk stations (Author 1), and one FGD was conducted with one of the main purchasers 
of the vegetable cooperative’s products (the purchaser being a kindergarten) (Author 1). 
Each FGD included a diverse set of actors: cooperative managers, members, hired staff 
(non-members), external contractors and district state officials responsible for promoting 
cooperation. These FGDs provided the core empirical evidence on the day-to-day perfor-
mance of Belgorod cooperatives. We then conducted an FGD and interview with the staff 
of another, smaller dairy cooperative (Author 2). Further, we conducted two interviews with 
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district officials concerning cooperative policy (Author 1 & Author 2), and a third interview 
with the deputy head of the regional department of agriculture; these three interviews were 
meant to gather insights into the regional approach of the authorities to cooperatives. Finally, 
we organised an FGD with regional officials to determine their ideas on the development 
of small-scale farms in the region (Author 1). Overall, case study information was collected 
from several stakeholders: the cooperatives themselves (including management, members, 
employees), actors who contract with cooperatives, district officials and regional officials. 
Both focus group discussions and interviews were open; although a topic list had been 
developed, we did not follow it strictly, in order to allow for lively and rich conversation.
Beyond the direct information on cooperatives described above, we collected more than 
30 interviews with a wide range of actors: representatives of various types of agricultural 
producers (large farm enterprises, family farms and household plots), officials at different 
hierarchical levels and the staff of social organisations (schools, kindergartens, hospitals, 
culture clubs and sport gyms). Those interviews, for a larger research project, of which the 
study of cooperatives constituted a part, enabled us to better understand the overall regional 
context and institutional environment in which cooperatives have to operate.
Proximity to a large urban centre can be an important factor influencing the marketing 
opportunities and overall development of a cooperative. The field visits covered seven rural 
districts, which roughly capture variety in distance to the regional capital. A cluster of two 
districts was selected directly neighbouring the central Belgorod district (around the regional 
capital), with a distance of 27 km and 54 km from the district centre to the regional capital. 
A case study cooperative was located in one of these districts. Further, the study included a 
cluster of two districts that were located at the border of the region, with a distance of 170 
and 185 km to the regional capital (the latter is the district furthest away from the regional 
centre). The other two case study cooperatives were located there. The remaining three 
districts visited during the research fall in between those two clusters in terms of distance.
Furthermore, government documents, regional articles and data from websites on coop-
eratives, district administrations and farmers were collected and analysed.
Agricultural producers and farmers’ cooperatives in Russia and Belgorod
Types of agricultural producers
Soviet agriculture, based primarily on collective and state farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) 
and secondly on small subsidiary household plots, was radically transformed after the demise 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Currently, three types of agricultural producers exist which 
dominate the successors of the above-mentioned producers in terms of their impact on 
overall agricultural production.
The first type of agricultural producers consists of farm enterprises – which is how we 
refer to the large-scale successors of state and collective farms in this article. These farm 
enterprises have various legal forms, such as joint stock or limited liability companies. In the 
2000s, Russia witnessed the entry of outside investors into the agribusiness sector, which 
occurred through the formation of agroholdings – conglomerations of multiple farm enter-
prises often also including other types of agribusiness enterprises such as processing firms.
The second type of agricultural producers consists of household plots, another Soviet 
legacy. The Soviet regime allowed rural dwellers employed at kolkhozes and sovkhozes to 
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have small plots of (at most) 0.1 hectares. Despite being ideologically alien, this form of 
private production and user rights was tolerated to compensate for insufficient food pro-
duction through collective farms.
The role of the third type of agricultural producers – the newly established private family 
farms, or simply, farmers (fermery) – is rather modest. Russian reformers – and their World 
Bank advisors – expected the 1990s agricultural reform and privatisation to lead to a rapid 
emergence of farmers, who would then become important players in Russian agriculture 
(Wegren, 1998). In reality, the emergence of farmers was piecemeal in most regions (Pallot 
& Nefedova, 2007; Wegren, 1998).9 An important obstacle to this process has been the pre-
dominance of large-scale input and output channels, which tend to exclude smaller-scale 
producers and new entrants, who lack personal connections with important actors in the 
food system (Pallot & Nefedova, 2007; Wegren, 1998). Although farm enterprises experienced 
a major downfall during the 1990s, the rural population preferred to remain employed by 
them and simultaneously increase production on their subsidiary household plots, instead 
of becoming individual farmers in the risky political–economic environment at the time 
(Amelina, 2000). As a result, the household plots’ share of agricultural output rose drastically 
in the 1990s (see Figure 1).
One important reason why rural dwellers have preferred plots over independent private 
farming is the fact that kolkhozes – and, to some extent, farm enterprises – provide(d) house-
holds with support services (Pallot & Nefedova, 2007; Visser, 2003, 2009; Wegren, 1998). These 
services include, for instance, ploughing, low cost feed grain for household livestock, and 
promoting household produce through the sales channels of the farm enterprise (Visser, 
2003). These services have been (partly) curtailed over the course of the late 1990s and 2000s 
(with the emergence of outside investors and agroholdings) (Nikulin, 2003; Pallot & Nefedova, 
2007; Visser, 2009). The share of household plots in Russia’s total agricultural output value 
has recently decreased, mainly due to recovery of the large farm enterprises. Nevertheless, 
they remain a crucial – although largely underestimated – element of Russian agriculture. 
That being said, the decline of farm enterprises’ support of household plots has increased 
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Figure 1. the share of different types of producers in agricultural GDP. source: Compiled by the authors 
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the need for alternative sales and input channels. As a consequence, the question of coop-
eratives as a potential solution has become more important.
Agricultural cooperatives in Russia: terminology and trends
Beyond a few rare exceptions (Nilsson, Golovina, & Volodina, 2008; Nilsson, Volodina, & 
Golovina, 2010; Yanbykh et al., 2012), the Russian literature on cooperatives lacks solid empir-
ical studies – especially at the micro level.10 Consequently, we draw on only a few articles 
concerning agricultural cooperatives in general and top-down cooperatives in particular.
We first clarify our use of the term ‘cooperatives’, and subsequently ‘top-down coopera-
tives’ more specifically. In this article, our empirical results refer to agricultural service coop-
eratives, which provide services to individual farms, and not to agricultural production 
cooperatives, where members pool production resources and farm jointly. As noted by 
Lerman (2013) and Millns (2013), opinions diverge on what constitutes a cooperative in 
post-socialist contexts. Some studies focus only on the legal label and consider large-scale 
farm enterprises – the privatised successors of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes – to be coop-
eratives. For instance, some articles (Golovina, Hess, Nilsson, & Wolz, 2014; Golovina, Nilsson, 
& Wolz, 2012, 2013) examine so-called Russian agricultural production cooperatives (in 
Russian, SPK) – an organisational form chosen by many former kolkhozes (along with joint 
stock and limited liability companies) after they were forcefully dissolved in the early 1990s 
in the course of President Yeltsin’s decollectivisation reform.11
The post-Soviet agricultural production cooperatives emerged from the ruins of the Soviet 
collective farms, and were initially perceived by reformers in the Kremlin as a temporary 
organisational form that would evolve into capitalist, private family farms (Wegren, 1998). 
However, they survived and remain one of the main legal forms of agricultural producers – 
though some scholars are quite pessimistic about their future (Gardner & Lerman, 2006). 
The cooperatives we consider in this article differ from SPKs in that they are newly created 
(not simply successors of the Soviet collective farms), and perform services for a group of 
more or less independent small-scale agricultural producers. In this sense those two types 
of cooperatives have a divergent nature (though cooperative in general), which reflects 
different trajectories of establishment and not only current laws. In terms of legislation, it is 
easier for production cooperatives to evolve into a firm (through internal evolution or take-
over by an agroholding) than to become a consumer cooperative. In the latter case it should 
be dissolved first and then reassembled according to the agreement of independent agri-
cultural producers.
The term ‘top-down cooperatives’ refers to the fact that such cooperatives are not estab-
lished bottom-up by the members, but instead initiated by the authorities. The Russian 
government required regions to establish cooperatives and provided some subsidies, but 
aside from that, the further development of cooperatives depends on the regional 
authorities.
Despite the small-scale producers’ strong need for support in terms of inputs, marketing 
and financial loans, cooperatives remain underdeveloped in Russia. Many cooperatives are 
either not active at all in practice, or function badly. As the former Russian Minister of 
Agriculture stated:
Yet, we have to admit that cooperation does not perform well. This is not laying blame, but a 
statement. (…) the real number [of active cooperatives] is unknown. Thus, we don’t have any 
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reasons to claim a well-designed and efficient system. Cooperatives are scattered, fragmented, 
performing chaotically and uncontrolled (Fedorov, 2013, p. 45).
Cooperatives’ success is measured not only by their quantity and member count (though 
those indicators are important because cooperatives can be efficient only when they have 
a certain magnitude); after all, cooperatives are not the ultimate goal. Their success is assessed 
mainly on the services they can provide to small-scale producers and the support to the 
latter in competition with large enterprises.
Within Russia, we can tentatively distinguish types of regions in terms of development 
of agricultural service cooperatives. First, most regions show very weak development of 
cooperatives. The cooperatives in those regions exist largely on paper. Such ‘virtual cooper-
atives’ have mostly emerged since 2006 when the national programme, which included a 
focus on cooperatives, began. The ‘virtual cooperatives’ have either been established bot-
tom-up with the (unfulfilled) hope of receiving a subsidy, or top-down by the regional author-
ities just following instructions from Moscow without any intrinsic motivation to make the 
cooperatives work (cf. Yanbykh et al., 2012). The Kurgan region is a clear example of this type 
of region (see below).
Second, there are regions where cooperatives have emerged bottom-up to some extent 
(ILO, 2009; Yanbykh et al., 2012). None of the Central Black Earth regions falls into this cate-
gory. Instead, it is the regions with substantial ethnic minorities (which tend to have a 
stronger presence in private and household farming (Pallot & Nefedova, 2007), and/or a 
stronger sector of private farmers more generally, which are overrepresented in this category. 
A clear example of the latter is Volgograd. It is mentioned as one of the four regions in Russia 
that has more than 100 agricultural cooperatives by Yanbykh et al. (2012), with farmers 
constituting the core of the membership of these cooperatives.
Third, there are a few regions where the regional authorities have gone beyond just 
creating cooperatives on paper to meet central government demands, by actively creating 
and supporting functioning cooperatives. Belgorod is the outspoken example here (Kurakin, 
2012; Yanbykh et al., 2012). Probably Tatarstan (ILO, 2009; Yanbykh et al., 2012) and recently 
Lipetsk (Lipetsk Government, 2012) somewhat resemble the example of Belgorod.
As mentioned earlier, the studies by Golovina and Nilsson (2009, 2011) allow us to ten-
tatively compare Belgorod’s practices and outcomes of top-down cooperative development 
with those from another region (Kurgan). As we show below, while the findings of the existing 
studies are more likely to be representative of cooperative trends in Russia at large (because 
agricultural consumer cooperatives still perform poorly at the country level), the practices 
we encountered in Belgorod, although not unique within Russia, appear to be rather diver-
gent from what seems the main pattern found in regions like Kurgan (the first type discussed 
above).12
In the Kurgan region, less than half of the planned cooperatives (21 out of 48) were actually 
created. Based on regional statistics and data collected up to a year after the cooperatives’ 
establishment, Golovina and Nilsson showed that the established cooperatives had not been 
successful. Moreover, the authors expected that ‘half a year or one year later, many of the 
co-operatives might already have been dissolved’ (Golovina & Nilsson, 2011, p. 61).
In Belgorod, however, cooperative establishment looks more promising. First, the number 
of cooperatives in Belgorod is much higher than in Kurgan (465 in 2009 compared to 21 in 
2008, respectively). Thus, even if only a minority of the cooperatives in Belgorod proves to 
be active in the future, they will still represent a sizeable number. Second, the Belgorod 
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cooperatives we studied also featured a substantially higher membership. In Kurgan, the 
cooperatives had fewer than eight members on average. In Belgorod, the cooperatives we 
visited had significantly more on average: while the small dairy cooperative had seven mem-
bers, the vegetable cooperative had 280 members, and the large dairy cooperative had no 
fewer than 1700. Moreover, while Golovina and Nilsson strongly doubted the Kurgan coop-
eratives’ ability to provide any significant benefits to their members, those we visited in 
Belgorod already provided some services and benefits, such as providing a market outlet 
for agricultural produce, and provision of inputs and/or in-kind credits. Moreover, they were 
planning to add new services and innovations – such as buying larger trucks and establishing 
processing units. While we cannot claim that our findings represent the entire Belgorod 
region, our exploratory field studies produced a picture that was quite different from the 
one in Kurgan.
Having briefly outlined the main differences between the Belgorod and Kurgan regions 
in terms of existing cooperatives, we now provide a more detailed comparison of govern-
ment policy on cooperatives and its outcomes in Russia at large and Belgorod in 
particular.
Cooperative development in the Belgorod region: tangible results in 
comparison to nationwide failure
Attempts to establish service cooperatives have been made throughout Russia, not only in 
the Belgorod and Kurgan regions. So far, as discussed above, the Belgorod region represents 
a relatively rare positive outcome. The main criterion of success here is not only the number 
of cooperatives established (as the creation of cooperatives is not the ultimate goal), but 
their ability to provide services for their members.
After the 1990s’ agricultural decline and policy-related urban bias, agriculture became a 
priority in the 2000s. New state programmes were initiated, including some on cooperatives. 
The state directed most funds to large farm enterprises – agroholdings in particular (Uzun, 
2005). A slight turn towards small-scale farming occurred in 2006–2007, with the national 
project for the development of agro-industrial complexes (AIC Development). This pro-
gramme was later transformed into several federal programmes that offer state support for 
household plot users and farmers, in order to provide some income to the increasing num-
bers of self-employed or unemployed rural dwellers. An important mechanism within those 
programmes was the establishment of supply and marketing cooperatives (Barsukova, 2007). 
These cooperatives are oriented toward small-scale producers, as the large farm enterprises’ 
size can ensure, on the one hand, that most of the farm services, storage and transport 
facilities are provided for in-house, and on the other, that they occupy a better bargaining 
position vis-à-vis suppliers and purchasers.
Although those programmes led to the establishment of cooperatives throughout Russia, 
state monitoring is virtually absent, and reliable official statistics on even basic figures – such 
as the number of cooperatives in the country – are not freely available for researchers. The 
Ministry of Agriculture only provides estimates. According to the Ministry, by 2012, 7746 
agricultural consumer cooperatives were registered, including 5971 processing, storage, 
supply and marketing cooperatives, and 1775 credit cooperatives; every third cooperative 
was inactive (Russian Ministry of Agriculture, 2013).
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The establishment of these cooperatives was largely carried out in a top-down fashion 
(Franks & Davydova, 2005; Golovina & Nilsson, 2011; Kurakin, 2012). Each Russian region was 
expected to establish cooperatives, and the federal government made agreements with 
regional administrations about their creation. In turn, the regional governments ordered 
district authorities to create a certain number of cooperatives. The cooperatives were sub-
sequently established largely by district and/or local authorities themselves, and partly 
financially supported by these authorities. The cooperatives’ management is typically rec-
ommended by the government at district or regional level, or at least has good relationships 
with governmental decision makers. Household plot holders and/or family farms are invited 
to become members without having to invest any money (except, sometimes, a minimal 
membership fee) or take on any obligations.
While this same process took place in Kurgan, Belgorod, and other regions, the outcomes 
differ per region, with Belgorod showing significantly better results compared to the national 
figures. Significantly, as will be shown, Belgorod’s top-down cooperatives provide real ser-
vices to their members. Although this is a very basic indicator of cooperative success, it allows 
us to identify the situation in Belgorod as quite divergent from the general Russian trend.
We would argue that these differences stemmed from the ‘Belgorod family farms’ regional 
programme. First implemented in 2007, the programme created a large number of cooper-
atives across the countryside, where previously there had been no signs of a sizeable bot-
tom-up cooperative movement in the region. According to official statistics, only 20 
agricultural cooperatives existed in the Belgorod region in the year 2000. By 2009, 465 had 
already been established, including 189 service (processing and marketing) cooperatives 
(Nikulin, 2009). The programme implemented a standardised approach to every district. 
According to the regional plan every district should establish between three and four service 
cooperatives on average (Belgorod Government, 2007). Every district was obliged to establish 
at least one milk cooperative, one supply cooperative,13 and at least one optional cooperative. 
Typically, the latter targeted niches that were not occupied by large-scale producers (e.g. 
vegetables, ducks, sheep etc.). Thus, while the Belgorod region itself may be divergent from 
much of the country, the districts we conducted our fieldwork in were standard in terms of 
governmental efforts to promote cooperatives in Belgorod.
To explore these issues further, we briefly present and discuss the case of a Belgorod dairy 
cooperative – whose ‘heart’, a small milk station that graded and refrigerated the cooperative 
members’ milk, was part of our fieldwork. This cooperative was founded in 2007 through 
the ‘Belgorod family farms’ regional programme, and was also supported by the district 
programme ‘Fresh milk’. In total, the cooperative had seven milk stations and collected milk 
mainly via its own trucks. Moreover, the cooperative had 41 employees, such as milk station 
testers, drivers, an engineer, an accountant and security guards. The milk stations provide 
services for all the districts’ settlements, with the milk collected from households accounting 
for 68% of the district’s cattle headcount (Alekseevsky Municipal Government, 2011) – a 
headcount that has been stable over the past few years. The cooperatives’ activities included 
purchasing milk from its members (all of them households) and selling it to the local milk 
processing factory. Apart from a few individual traders at the district central market, the milk 
factory was the only buyer of the cooperative’s milk at the time of our fieldwork. The coop-
erative also provided in-kind loans to its members, who were allowed to buy cows on credit 
and pay for them through milk delivery. In addition, the cooperative supported its members 
by providing fodder for livestock.
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With regard to the fulfilment of the stated aims, the top-down cooperatives we studied 
were indeed able to provide a stable marketing channel, which rural dwellers had no previous 
access to.14 The cooperatives provided the household producers with a stable sales channel 
that guaranteed purchase of their product and reliable payments. In addition, the cooper-
atives offered the household plot holders small-scale credit and access to inputs. In so doing, 
the cooperatives were ‘alive’ – that is, providing real services for their members.
How viable are the cooperatives in this region? The Belgorod authorities do not predict 
significant further growth in their number. This, however, does not necessarily signal the 
stagnation of the cooperative movement, or its lack of viability; it could simply be the normal 
economic pattern of saturation – or even overcapacity – in terms of the number of cooper-
atives. In contrast, Golovina and Nilsson (2009, 2011) feared that many cooperatives in the 
Kurgan region would already be dissolved within one year of being established. Thus, it 
would be too hasty to interpret the ‘stagnation’ of the number of cooperatives – or even a 
decrease in the number of active cooperatives – as evidence of the top-down established 
cooperatives’ failure in the Belgorod region. If nothing else, any form of cooperative (grass-
roots-based, or business-like) would struggle with such a large number of competitors as 
those reported in the region.
In the next section, we analyse the causes for the remarkable growth of quite ‘healthy’ 
cooperatives in the Belgorod region.
Administratively constructed market niches as the main driver of 
cooperative development
The Belgorod regional government administers a range of social programmes, such as rural 
housing, rural infrastructure projects and rural start-up grants. One of these, as described 
above, is the ‘Belgorod family farms’ programme, which provides support to farmers and 
household plot producers. The Belgorod regional government does not expect the pro-
gramme participants to be nearly as efficient as agroholdings and farm enterprises more 
generally.15 The authorities do take into account economic motives, but the most important 
aim is stimulating local, small-scale agricultural production. Belgorod officials regard the 
latter as a factor in the viability of rural settlements, and as the cure for rural depopulation, 
alcoholism and indifference. Thus, the programme’s declared goals are not economic, but 
socially-oriented, with the ultimate aim to ‘reconstruct the mind of the villager and to stim-
ulate him/her to produce competitive market goods’ (Belgorod Government, 2007). In more 
pragmatic terms, the programme’s goal is to increase the viability of the self-employed rural 
dwellers’ ventures, and to help them overcome long-term poverty.16 The programme focuses 
on those types of agricultural production where large-scale producers are not the dominant 
players, such as dairy farming, sheep and rabbit breeding, and beekeeping. As such, it creates 
market niches for farmers and household plot producers, shielding them from severe com-
petition from large farm enterprises. The development of rural cooperatives is an important 
part of the ‘Belgorod family farms’ programme, and is seen as a means of providing a market 
for small-scale, family producers, for whom the problem of finding sales channels is particu-
larly acute.
The fact that the regional government is attempting to address the issue of rural devel-
opment beyond window dressing and ‘just following Moscow’s instructions’ is indicated by 
the special administrative structure that was created to promote, implement and monitor 
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the programme. The programme documents describe the administrative structure as a ‘ver-
tically integrated three-level managerial system: region–district–municipality’. Officials were 
appointed to manage the implementation of the programme at all three levels, and a special 
task force was created at the regional level. Furthermore, the programme gets substantial 
attention from the regional governor (for instance, through visits to producers involved in 
the programme) and from the regional media.
Now that we have addressed the crucial role of Belgorod’s regional administration in the 
emergence of cooperatives, we turn our attention to its impact on the subsequent operations 
of these top-down established cooperatives. Specifically, we found that the effect of the 
local administration is visible beyond the cooperative’s founding. From our interviews and 
focus group discussions, it became clear that the ‘Belgorod family farms’ programme had 
created – through strong state influence – complete food chains into which these cooper-
atives are integrated (Kurakin, 2012). In fact, the local, district and/or regional administrations 
had established secure market niches for the cooperatives, with guaranteed sales on different 
levels. This situation is somewhat opposite to the classical case where cooperatives emerge 
to produce a countervailing power to large firms (see Bijman & Hendrikse, 2003). In the case 
of marketing cooperatives, the latter are buyers (for the case of post-Soviet Armenia see 
Gorton et al., 2015). In Belgorod, cooperatives do not generate any bargaining power them-
selves but instead are shielded from market competition by the state.
In turn, cooperatives were expected to recruit as many new member households as 
possible. From the regional government’s perspective, this was one of the fundamental 
factors of the programme’s success. It was also one of the indicators used by the regional 
administration to monitor the implementation of the programme at the district level. 
These sales channels were, de facto, controlled by the state. In the case of the vegetable 
cooperative we studied, state influence manifested itself through contracts between the 
cooperatives and municipal social organisations (such as schools and hospitals). Being 
one of the key sales channels of the vegetable cooperative, all of those contracts were 
signed at once rather than emerging gradually (Vegetable cooperative chairman, FGD, 
20 October 2010). This suggests that those contracts did not result from free market 
competition but, instead, from the administrative decisions of the local authorities, which 
mediated between the cooperative and the social organisations. By being integrated in 
these sales channels, the cooperatives were largely shielded from the economic compe-
tition inside the region.
It is worth noting that market forces nevertheless played a considerable role here. 
Although the very small household producers had hardly any alternative sales channels, 
private farmers could only be motivated to conduct transactions with cooperatives by means 
of economic incentives. In the case of the large dairy cooperative we studied, the secure 
channels’ only buyer was a milk factory, which, although private, was strongly influenced by 
the district authorities. For instance, when a conflict emerged between the milk factory and 
the dairy cooperative, the district head personally intervened and pressured the milk factory 
not to terminate its relationship with the cooperative (Dairy cooperative chairman, FGD, 20 
October 2010).17 The private ownership of the milk factory did not preclude the authorities 
from using the same administrative negotiation practices used for creating a sales channel 
for the cooperative.
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A conversion to what? Tensions and plans in top-down cooperatives
The top-down nature of cooperatives is often claimed (or, more implicitly, expected) to 
discourage member involvement (Barton, 1989; Dunn, 1988), but this does not always have 
to be the case. In some cases, the authorities’ interests and plans may coincide with those 
of the agricultural producers involved in the cooperatives. More importantly, as members 
continue to benefit from the cooperatives’ services, and trust and involvement increase, the 
top-down cooperatives might become more appealing to potential members. While research 
on cooperatives generally approaches social capital as a prerequisite for the emergence of 
grassroots cooperatives, some authors argue that the existence of cooperatives might itself 
lead to an increase in social capital among members in the early phases, and contribute to 
community development (Zeuli & Radel, 2005). As such, top-down established cooperatives 
can potentially be a solution in settings where social capital is too low to allow for the grass-
roots emergence of cooperatives (particularly, but not exclusively, in post-socialist countries). 
The question is whether top-down cooperatives can transform into more common cooper-
ative forms within the post-socialist, Russian setting. Here we narrow down this issue and 
consider it in the Belgorod context. A transition towards the classic cooperative model would 
mean a gradual trend towards more member control and involvement. In the following 
sub-sections, we explore whether changes in this direction took place in the cooperatives 
we examined, and whether some stakeholders had plans to bring about such changes.
Cooperative members: problems of identity
To begin with, households, constituting the majority of the cooperative members, did not 
follow widely recognised cooperative principles. The case of the large dairy cooperative is 
quite illustrative here (FGD, 20 October 2010). In the beginning, it was difficult to convince 
households to join the cooperative. To incentivise them, the membership fee was very small, 
and the ordinary members had no financial responsibility for the cooperative’s performance. 
In other words, there was a green light for every candidate. Without these measures, it would 
have been difficult to recruit any sizeable number of members. As officials from the Regional 
Department of Agriculture stated, ‘Interest should grow from below. Cooperatives can be 
created from above, but the interest from below is necessary’ (FGD with officials from the 
Belgorod Department of Agriculture, 23 October 2010). However, according to Ostrom’s 
(1990) principles for common pool resource management, this practice should have its 
downsides. For instance, she argues that the boundaries of a local community or organisation 
should be clearly defined in order to effectively exclude unwanted participants, and to avoid 
a free rider problem. Moreover, a sanction system should be established against those who 
violate the community rules.18 The dairy cooperative failed to follow both of these principles, 
thus opening itself up to the following problems.
When discussing the difficulties the cooperative faced, the chairman noted – among 
other issues – the members’ lack of attachment to the cooperative. Here, she referred to their 
opportunistic behaviour with regard to marketing their produce.19 For instance, they would 
sell their milk to itinerant traders from the neighbouring Voronezh region, who would then 
sell it to factories there. In this way, the milk was ‘leaking’ from the cooperative, thereby 
reducing its revenue. The cooperative management used this fact to explain the abrupt 
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decrease in annual profits: in 2009, the cooperative had registered a profit of 2.6 million 
roubles, while the profit for 2010 was estimated to be approximately 1.3 million roubles.
The household members’ reason for selling their milk to the itinerant traders was purely 
financial: in certain periods, traders offered higher prices than the cooperative. The cooper-
ative’s occasionally disadvantageous pricing practices came as a result of its contractual 
obligations towards its suppliers and purchasers – which decreased its flexibility – and the 
rigid price-making policy enforced by the state.20
That being said, while households were, at first, drawn away by the higher prices offered 
by the itinerant traders, they seemed to increasingly appreciate the benefits provided by 
the cooperative. According to the cooperative’s chairman, the itinerant entrepreneurs fre-
quently delayed payments to the households selling them their milk, because milk factories 
in turn delayed payments to them. Furthermore, the itinerant traders flexibly chose their 
suppliers, and would rapidly relocate from the district when lower-priced milk was offered 
elsewhere. Members increasingly preferred to work with the cooperative, because it provided 
a guaranteed outlet and stable prices and payment. Thus, the erosion of ties between the 
member households and the cooperative appeared to halt in time. Nevertheless, the house-
holds still enjoyed a double (or intermediate) position: although they generally sold milk to 
the cooperative, they could – and would – sometimes make profitable deals with outsiders. 
In other words, they did not (yet) act as true cooperative members. Thus, the cooperative’s 
‘victory’ was likely only a temporary equilibrium.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the crucial factor in the households’ decisions 
to become cooperative members was the advantages the cooperative held over other mar-
keting outlets – such as stable pricing and long-term contracts. Of course, part of these 
advantages resulted from the cooperative’s state-led (and state-protected) character, and 
the outlet’s cooperative nature itself. The stability it provided would be difficult to achieve 
by purely commercial purchasers. Moreover, except for the already mentioned small-scale 
itinerant traders, commercial purchasers are generally not interested in small-scale produc-
ers, opting for larger-scale producers with lower transaction costs.
The cooperative’s management: prevailing business logic
Although the large dairy cooperative’s members behaved opportunistically and lost sight 
of the cooperative’s interests, the management paid little attention to increasing the house-
holds’ involvement in the cooperative’s decision-making, or to actively encourage the house-
holds to invest in the cooperative. The management perceived such efforts as fruitless and/
or very costly (instead, they focused on direct economic incentives through delivered services 
only). In fact, business logic rather than cooperative logic seemed to inform the manage-
ment’s actions in all three cooperatives that were part of our field study – something which 
would, over time, result in a narrower pool of household members. First, in the case of all 
three cooperatives, the management increasingly aimed to focus on a limited group of 
medium-sized and/or high quality producers, rather than targeting as many households in 
the district as possible. Second, the management of the large dairy cooperative and the 
vegetable cooperative consistently referred to ‘profits’ during our conversations. In the case 
of the small dairy cooperative, the management indicated that it sought an expansion into 
higher-end market outlets, which would exclude the household members as suppliers. While 
classic cooperatives might produce a profit, the sum is redistributed to the members in the 
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form of patronage payments. As previously mentioned, this contradiction with cooperative 
principles stems from the perception – both by the members and the management – of the 
cooperative as a simple outlet, or mediator between farmers and processing companies. 
The studied cooperatives are, de facto, in the hands of their management – namely, the 
actors who invested financial resources (and should therefore, according to business logic, 
receive all the profit).21 Thus, it is not surprising that the management of the studied coop-
eratives were using market terminology and pursuing market logic goals (such as targeting 
higher-end markets), instead of targeting the needs of the member households. When asked 
whether they distribute the cooperative’s profit among its members, the manager of the 
small dairy cooperative, for instance, answered, ‘In general, initially, we imagined it like that. 
But I can say that we have, currently, unfortunately, already stopped doing so’ (FGD November 
2013).
We can further trace the signs of market logic in the long-term goals of the large dairy 
cooperative’s management. The management planned to shift its focus over time towards 
relatively large suppliers (in terms of the cattle number per household). The cooperative was 
interested in households with diversified, small-scale, semi-subsistent production that would 
enlarge and eventually specialise in keeping 10–20 cows. As the ideal example, the cooper-
ative’s chairman described a household member that was keeping 46 cows and using a small 
refrigerator – an example which clearly resembles an average private family farm more than 
a household plot. The chairman of the small dairy cooperative even stated that ‘there is a 
strong desire to change the ownership form’ [namely into a limited liability company] (FGD 
November 2013).
The state vs. cooperative management: confronting logics
The fact that the cooperatives’ management had not implemented their planned strategies 
by the end of the data collection period was largely due to the influence of the district 
authorities. Without doubt, it would be much easier to deal with the large household pro-
ducers the management envisioned, as they would decrease transport and testing costs. 
However, in the eyes of the district administration, this logic would oppose the cooperatives’ 
goals, which – as seen by the administration – should be primarily social rather than eco-
nomic. As mentioned earlier, the goal of the district and regional administrations was to 
increase the households’ livestock numbers, in order to increase rural incomes and combat 
poverty, inequality and rural depopulation (Belgorod Government, 2007). Focusing on a few 
larger household producers would go against these social goals.
There are no indications (yet) of a transformation to a classic, member-based cooperative. 
From the side of the members, there is significant opportunistic behaviour, and practically 
no involvement. From the side of the management there are no plans to further the involve-
ment of members. On the contrary, the management follows business logic that would lead 
to the exclusion of a large proportion of the members, were it to be enforced as planned. 
As mentioned above, one cooperative’s management even explicitly stated that it would 
like to convert into a conventional company. It is the authorities that prevent such a devel-
opment. Thus goal congruence between the various stakeholders, which tends to decline 
over the course of a cooperative’s life cycle (Hind, 1999), was, in the case of the Belgorod 
region, largely prevented by state pressure on the management to continue to nurture a 
wide constituency of rural households.
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Conclusions
The first question the article dealt with was: how much influence does the state exert on 
these top-down established cooperatives? Based on our field study in the Belgorod region, 
we have shown that, beyond the establishment process, the state also had a strong influence 
on the cooperatives’ daily operations. For instance, through administrative bargaining with 
economic actors in the agrofood sector, the state had created secure sales channels for the 
cooperatives. This state influence had both benefits and drawbacks. On the positive side, it 
ensured guaranteed sales for the cooperatives, and, subsequently for the households they 
targeted.22 Furthermore, the state’s influence on price setting within the sales channel led 
to stable farm gate prices for the rural households. On the negative side, the cooperatives 
and households could not profit from temporary price increases, as the state exerted a certain 
pressure to keep regional food prices down. In addition, it made cooperatives dependent 
on governmental protection, which calls their competitiveness into question. There is no 
indication that authorities plan a phasing out of state protection.
Although we presented various tensions and shortcomings associated with the top-down 
cooperatives we studied, it should be noted that the small-scale producers targeted by the 
cooperatives face a rather hostile economic environment (see e.g. Pallot & Nefedova, 2007). 
Our findings suggest that cooperatives in the Belgorod region positively affected the house-
hold producers’ subsistence. The cooperatives provide a stable sales channel, which in itself 
makes a significant difference to the rural dwellers.
Our findings regarding top-down established cooperatives are clearly less negative than 
those of Golovina and Nilsson (2009, 2011). The difference seems to stem from the goals of 
the regional authorities. In Kurgan, they only set out to establish the number of cooperatives 
required by the federal authorities, whereas in Belgorod, they formulated a regional vision 
on rural development, which viewed cooperatives as an important building block.
The second question we raised at the beginning of the article was whether top-down 
cooperatives could form the basis for a (gradual) conversion towards less state-led cooper-
atives, whose members are more involved. As our fieldwork took place in only one region – 
it being quite divergent form the majority of Russian regions – our answer to this question 
is only tentative, and looks to Russia’s pre-Soviet history for potentially added relevance. As 
previously mentioned, Russia was at the forefront of the European cooperative movement 
during its late Imperial era. Historians have argued that, during the movement’s first phase, 
cooperatives were enforced by the government (Figurovskaya & Pirumova, 1991). Initially, 
the state’s financial support to cooperatives far exceeded their members’ financial contribu-
tions; over time, the cooperatives evolved to become more member-based and 
member-controlled.
We could not find any indication that a conversion towards a more member-based/con-
trolled cooperative model was taking place in Belgorod. Neither the state, nor the cooper-
ative management, nor yet the cooperatives’ members expressed an interest in achieving 
this. Moreover, even if the authorities and management made this the cooperatives’ goal, 
the conversion would be far from certain. In the short and medium term, conversion into 
more profit-oriented, business-like cooperatives would be more likely, especially if the 
regional authorities were to end their support, and/or their requirements regarding the 
cooperatives’ social role. The shift towards prevailing business logic seems to be true for 
Russia in general. ILO (2009, p. 15) reports that the agricultural marketing cooperatives in 
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Russia showed a decline in their numbers ‘due to their stepping out of limits of their sphere 
of business activity, with the purpose of raising profitability of trading operations’. In the 
long term, for the widespread emergence of agricultural cooperatives to occur in a setting 
of scarce social capital and weak market institutions for small-scale farms (as is the case in 
Russia), strong government support seems to some scholars to be the only resort (cf. Efendiev 
& Sorokin, 2013).
The conversion towards a more member-controlled cooperative type was also far from 
smooth in imperial Russia. Although the Tsarist state made significant efforts to promote 
cooperatives and cooperative values among the rural population (a policy currently lacking 
at the federal level), the early results were mixed (Figurovskaya & Pirumova, 1991). In some 
regions, the cooperative movement did not take off at all; in others, fictitious cooperatives 
were established in order to launder state money (Figurovskaya & Pirumova, 1991). 
Nevertheless, as time passed and more resources were spent, a more grassroots cooperative 
movement emerged, and the number of cooperatives experienced explosive growth. This 
turned Russia into one of the world leaders in the cooperative movement, with cooperatives 
constituting, in the words of Bilimovich ([1955] 2005, p. 73), ‘one of the cornerstones of the 
overall Russian economic system’.
Currently, Russian cooperatives are far from becoming a cornerstone of the agricultural 
sector. Significant ‘building work’ must be done, and the phase to come (which, among other 
goals, would target the creation of member attachment) is likely to be much more difficult 
than the previous one. The cooperative examples we described from the Belgorod region 
are a first step in this development, as the cooperatives – while not member-controlled – 
nevertheless are member-oriented, and benefit a wide range of rural dwellers.23 In this con-
text, it is good to remember that classic cooperatives in various Western European countries 
were strongly supported by the government in their early stages (although not to the point 
where they would be shielded from market competition). While in Denmark and the 
Netherlands – the countries mostly referred to as the classical examples of early European 
cooperatives – the development of cooperatives was strongly bottom-up, with very limited 
state involvement (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2001), in other countries – such as Belgium, France, 
and Italy – the state played a much more important role (Gutiérrez et al., 2005, Millns, n.d.).24 
Thus, in order to better understand agricultural cooperatives in Russia, aside from more 
empirical research (both qualitative, quantitative and mix methods), it is important to expand 
our comparisons beyond the classic historical examples of Denmark and the Netherlands, 
which are the generally chosen point of reference (whether explicitly or implicitly). Specifically, 
it would be helpful to make use of historical examples where the state was relatively more 
involved in the development of agricultural cooperatives – whether from European countries 
in general, or (post-)socialist and/or emerging economies, such as China.
Notes
1.  There are quite a number of journals specifically focused on cooperatives. Some of them 
are long established such as RECMA (founded in 1921) and Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics (founded in 1908), while others were founded recently such as the Journal of 
Co-operative Organization and Management (published from 2013). Although they are not 
exclusively focused on agricultural cooperation, rural issues are widely represented in studies 
on cooperatives. Journal of Cooperatives has agrarian roots (it was formerly called Journal of 
Agricultural Cooperation). Finally, we mention the Journal of Rural Cooperation (published by 
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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) which is currently inactive. Obviously, publications on 
cooperative issues can also be found in other, non-specialised, journals. However, cooperatives 
currently seem to have become a marginal topic, with few scholars working on it (for instance 
in economics, see Kalmi, 2007) and many of the journals on cooperatives are indexed neither 
by WoS nor Scopus.
2.  This reflects the wider global trend that attention to cooperatives has declined since the 1980s 
(see e.g. Kalmi, 2007; Mazzarol, Reboud, Limnios, & Clark, 2014 ).
3.  With regard to rural movements engaged in political issues, such as the struggle for protection 
of land rights of the rural population against raiders, the increased restrictions on civil society 
and attempts to embed such organisations in the state in order to control them are an 
important cause of the weakness of rural organisations (Mamonova & Visser, 2014). In the 
case of agricultural cooperatives, which only have a socio-economic orientation, this does 
not seem to play a role.
4.  International comparative studies provide some indicators of the low level of social capital in 
Russia at large. For example, the World Bank (2006) survey indicates a low level of intangible 
capital in Russia (which includes human capital, social capital, governance etc.). We have to note 
though, that such general indicators should be treated with caution. Some case studies of rural 
areas confirm those results (Small, 2002) while others confront them providing a more nuanced 
vision (Patsiorkovsky, 2003). For instance, Small in her case study focuses on collective actions 
arguing that there are ‘no community organisations, formal co-operation or volunteer activity’ 
and investigates the ‘influence of a command society on social capital formation’. Patsiorkovsky 
points out that social capital could be found not only in organisations but also in kinship 
network structures (relatives, neighbours, friends). So, those are different dimensions of social 
capital. Here we refer to social capital as the basis for collective action in Putnam’s (2000) sense. 
While rural households’ social capital in the form of informal networks (mainly presented in 
kinship ties) have even increased as a response to shock therapy reforms in various cases (see 
O’Brien, Patsiorkovski, & Dershem, 2000; O’Brien, Wegren, & Patsiorkovsky, 2005), participation 
in community-wide activities has clearly declined (O’Brien et al., 2000, 2005; Visser, 2008). Thus 
social capital on the level of rural communities remains low, hindering cooperation beyond 
kinship circles.
5.  This is not only relevant in the Russian context. In the majority of post-socialist countries, 
cooperative-related problems are especially acute due to the low levels of trust and social 
capital in rural society at large (Millns, 2013; O’Brien et al., 2005; Tisenkopfs, Kovách, Lošťák, 
& Šūmane, 2010), the legacies of the (semi)totalitarian socialist systems, and the economic 
chaos, rent seeking behaviour, and general opportunism generated during the shock therapy 
reforms in the early 1990s.
6.  The grassroots nature of cooperatives is emphasised in the cooperative literature and ideology 
from the very beginning (i.e. the Rochdale, Raiffeisen and then ICA cooperative principles; see 
also Dunn, 1988). For instance, Zeuli and Cropp’s (2004) textbook ignores the issue of top-down 
cooperatives. Moreover, Mazzarol et al. (2014) refer to Kalmi (2007), who argues that economics 
has lost interest in cooperative studies partly because it began to focus more on top-down 
rather than bottom-up solutions to economic problems. Kalmi thus implies the primacy of the 
bottom-up nature of cooperatives in the (economic) scholarly literature.
7.  Recently, Petruchenya and Hendrikse (2014) suggested a more balanced approach to the 
emergence of cooperatives, where their top-down creation (associated mainly with non-
Western countries) is viewed as a possible path of cooperative establishment. However, they 
focus on formal economic game modelling, while we focus on empirical evidence.
8.  Belgorod has always been among the leading agrarian regions in Russia due to fertile soils 
and a favourable climate. However, its recent success in agriculture relies on intensification 
of production, rather than on extensive development, as in some other Russian regions (e.g. 
those with vast surfaces of arable land in Western Siberia).
9.  In some regions and sub-sectors (e.g. grain), the emergence of farmers has been rather 
substantial (Pallot & Nefedova, 2007). Moreover, some authors have recently evaluated the 
farmer movement in a more positive light (Wegren, 2011).
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10.  Trends in the literature on cooperatives in Russia are reflected in the collective monograph ‘The 
state and prospects of consumer cooperation in Russia’ that will be published by Tsentrosoyuz 
(Busygin, in press ).
11.  One of the main contributors to the law ‘On agricultural cooperation’ V. Vershinin (2015) 
explicitly points out that one of the general purposes of the double nature (reflected in the 
law) of Russian agricultural cooperatives (consumer versus production cooperatives) was to 
give collective farms the option to preserve their status in the decollectivisation process during 
the agrarian reforms of the 1990s, by registering as production cooperatives. Thus, production 
cooperatives could be called post-Soviet kolkhozes.
12.  For example, the resolution of the second section (‘The development of agricultural consumer 
and service cooperation’) of the first Russian congress of rural cooperatives notes that ‘this 
type of cooperation is in its infancy’ (Proceedings, 2013, p. 27). ILO (2009, p. 15) speaks with 
regard to agricultural service cooperatives about the ‘inertness of its development process’, 
although it notes that there are regional differences. According to Yanbykh et al. (2012), the 
leading regions in Russia are Volgograd, Tyumen, Mordovia and Yakutia. In Lipetsk region, the 
regional programme for cooperative development resembles Belgorod’s top-down experience 
(Lipetsk Government, 2012). However, the lack of research on Lipetsk (as on most other regions) 
precludes making comparisons that are more detailed.
13.  Supply cooperatives here serve as substitutes to consumer societies in the Tsentrosoyuz system, 
which was established as part of the Soviet cooperative system to provide rural areas with 
consumer goods and procure agricultural products from rural households. The Tsentrosoyuz 
cooperative organisation survived in reduced form after the collapse of socialist agriculture 
(http://www.rus.coop/en/about-us/figures/).
14.  The only two options that were available to household milk producers before the establishment 
of the cooperative were individual traders and the district’s central market (or ‘farmers’ market’). 
Before the emergence of the cooperatives, households tended to get rid of their cows due 
to many reasons including the lack of appropriate market channels to sell their milk, in line 
with the general tendency in the Russian countryside of households reducing their livestock 
including cows, pigs and chickens (Rosstat, 2015). The establishment of cooperatives stimulated 
households in Belgorod to keep their cows.
15.  This is the general perception among policy makers, agro-business representatives and most of 
the rural population, although – for various products – household plots and family farms have 
yields that are quite close to, or even equal to, those of large farm enterprises (see e.g. Visser, 
Mamonova, Spoor, & Nikulin, 2015 for different views and data on production).
16.  ‘Tens of thousands of self-employed individuals live in the Belgorod region by making use of 
their household plots. As a rule, they have a low income because of the primitive agriculture 
they employ, and the lack of sales channels.’ According to the programme’s authors, its goal is 
to fight self-reproducing poverty in rural areas by developing rural entrepreneurship (Belgorod 
Government, 2007).
17.  While district and regional authorities are able to influence district and regional level enterprises, 
that is much harder with regard to very large companies operating countrywide, such as 
supermarket chains (FGD small dairy cooperative, 6 November 2013).
18.  The other six principles are the following: (1) fitting the rules that govern the use of common 
resources to the local conditions; (2) ensuring that resource appropriators participate in 
decision-making; (3) effectively monitoring members’ behaviour; (4) establishing cheap and 
easy mechanisms of conflict resolution; (5) ensuring the recognition of outside authorities; and 
(6) developing a multilayered organisation (if common pool resources are large).
19.  It shows that the management of those top-down cooperatives often clearly understands 
the low involvement of their members, but it treats this situation as a given, i.e. it does not 
attempt to increase members’ loyalty but tries to find solutions under the condition of a low 
level of loyalty.
20.  The cooperative was constrained from increasing its sales prices, due to pressures from the 
regional authorities, who aimed to keep the district’s end-consumer prices low.
21.  Although, as discussed earlier, with substantial state influence (see also next section).
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22.  This arrangement is not unique. For example, in Brazil the state obligated schools to purchase 
food only from small-scale producers (IPC–IG, 2013; Otsuki, 2012).
23.  As mentioned earlier, in the case of the small dairy cooperative, the member orientation was 
present initially but declined later.
24.  Millns (n.d., p. 5), for example, states that ‘probably only Holland and Denmark could argue 
strongly that competitive market-based agricultural cooperatives developed with relatively 
little State support’. In both countries, ‘the culture of “cooperation”’ is ‘well integrated through 
many aspects of society at an early age’, which is not always the case in most other Western 
countries. For more on the development of the two divergent cooperative models in Europe, 
see Gutiérrez et al. (2005).
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